We study an optimal admission of arriving customers to a Markovian finitecapacity queue, e.g. M/M/c/N queue, with several customer types. The system managers are paid for serving customers and penalized for rejecting them. The rewards and penalties depend on customer types. The goal is to maximize the average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint on the average penalties per unit time. We provide a solution to this problem based on Lagrangian optimization. For a feasible problem, we show the existence of a randomized trunk reservation optimal policy with the acceptance thresholds for different customer types ordered according to a linear combination of the service rewards and rejection costs. In addition, we prove that any 1-randomized stationary optimal policy has this structure. In particular, we establish the structure of an optimal policy that maximizes the average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint on the blocking probability for one of the customer types or for a group of customer types pooled together.
Introduction
This paper describes the structure of optimal admission policies to finite capacity queues, including M/M/c/N queues, with a fixed number of customer types. At the arrival epoch a customer can be either rejected or accepted. The latter is possible only if the system is not full. Each customer type i = 1, 2, . . . , m, where m is the number of customer types, is characterized by three parameters: a Poisson arrival rate λ i , a reward r i that a customer pays for the service, and a penalty c i paid to a rejected customer. The service times do not depend on the customer types. The goal is to maximize the average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint that the average penalty per unit time does not exceed a certain number. Such problems arise, for example, when the goal is to maximize the average rewards per unit time subject to the quality of service (QoS) constraint. , at most one number is noninteger and at least one number equals N − 1. For a number M we denote by M the integer part of M . If the system is controlled by the policy φ, a type i arrival will be admitted with probability 1 if it sees no more than M φ i customers in the system, it will be rejected if the number of customers in the system exceeds M φ i + 1, and it will be accepted with the probability (M If all the thresholds are integers, the randomized trunk reservation policy is called a trunk reservation policy. We sometimes write M i instead of M φ i for the thresholds when there is only one policy in the context and no confusion will occur.
In this paper, we prove that, if the problem is feasible, then there exists a randomized trunk reservation policy that is consistent with the reward function r i = r i +ū 1 c i , whereū 1 ≥ 0 is a Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the first constraint of the linear programming problem formulated in this paper. In addition, Theorem 2.3 below shows that any 1-randomized stationary optimal policy is a randomized trunk reservation policy that is consistent with r .
Miller [21] studied a one-criterion problem for an M/M/c/loss queue when r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m . In this case, there exists an optimal non-randomized trunk reservation policy that is consistent with r. In other words, all the thresholds M i are integers and N − 1 = M 1 ≥ M 2 ≥ · · · ≥ M m . Feinberg and Reiman [9] studied a constrained problem with r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m , where the goal is to maximize average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint that the blocking probability for type 1 customers does not exceed a given level. Feinberg and Reiman [9] proved the existence of an optimal randomized trunk reservation policy with
Instead of considering M/M/c/loss or M/M/c/N queues, Feinberg and Reiman [9] made a more general assumption that the service rate µ n , when there are n customers in the system, does not decrease in n. This assumption holds for M/M/c/N queues. In this paper, we also consider systems that satisfy this assumption.
This research was initially motivated by the following natural question: what is the solution for the problem with r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m when the goal is to maximize the average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint that the blocking probability for type j customers does not exceed a given number? This is a particular case of the problem considered in this paper when c j = λ j −1 and c i = 0, i = j. Therefore, r i = r j +ū 1 /λ j , if i = j; r i , otherwise.
(1.1)
Sinceū 1 ≥ 0, in view of (1.1), we have r j ≥ r j . Thus, Corollary 2.2 below implies that, when r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ · · · ≥ r m , for a feasible problem, there exists an optimal randomized trunk reservation policy with
In other words, the threshold for type j customers can increase. In the particular case when j = 1, studied by Feinberg and Reiman [9] , the orders r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m and r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m coincide and, therefore, we have that M 1 = N − 1 is the highest threshold. If the constraint limits the blocking probability for several customer types pooled together, then the optimal policy also has a simple structure described in Corollary 2.5. This corollary implies that, if r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m and there is a constraint on the blocking probability for the customers of types 1, 2, . . . , k pooled together, k ≤ m, then the optimal policy is again a randomized trunk reservation policy consistent with r. We remark that our main result, Theorem 2.3, is a stronger statement than just the existence of an optimal randomized trunk reservation policy, which is Corollary 2.2. We prove that any randomized optimal stationary policy, that uses a randomization procedure in at most one state, has a randomized trunk reservation form. We recall that for 1-constrained semi-Markov or continuous-time Markov decision processes describing the problem considered in this paper, when the problem is feasible, there exists a randomized stationary optimal policy that uses a randomization procedure in at most one state; see Feinberg [5] or [6] .
In Feinberg and Reiman [9, Sections 6 and 7] , several more predictable optimal policies and optimal non-randomized strategies were constructed. Similar results can be obtained for the more general problem considered in this paper. In fact, these constructions hold as long as the optimality of randomized trunk reservation policies is established.
In addition to the classical Miller's [21] problem formulation and its constrained version studied by Feinberg and Reiman [9] , various versions and generalizations of the admission problem have been studied in the literature. Lippman [19] studied a problem with an infinite number of customer classes. Other early references can be found in the surveys by Crabill et al. [4] and by Stidham [28] . Nguyen [22] considered a queueing system with two types of arrivals: one type is generated by a Poisson process and the other is an overflow process of an M/M/m/m queue. Carrizosa et al. [3] studied an M/G/c/loss queue with different service distributions for different customer types. The control parameter is the probability to accept an arrival, if the system has available space. This probability depends on the arrived customer type and does not depend on the state of the system. Lewis, Ayhan and Foley [15, 16] investigated the bias optimality. Lewis [14] studied a dual admission control scheme to an M/M/1 queue with the service times depending on customer types. Lin and Ross [17, 18] considered optimal admission control policies with a gatekeeper for M/M/1/loss queues where the gatekeeper cannot know the busy-idle status of the server. Piunovskiy [24] studied bicriterion control of the arrival intensity for an M/M/1 queue. Admission control problems with customers requiring multiple servers were considered by Kelly [12] , Key [13] , Ross and Yao [27] , Papastavrou et al. [23] , and Altman et al. [2] . If service times depend on customer types or different types of customers require different numbers of servers, the problem becomes NP-hard and trunk reservation may not be optimal; see Ross [26, p. 137] and Altman et al. [2] . However, a trunk reservation policy is asymptotically optimal under certain conditions; Hunt and Laws [11] , Puhalskii and Reiman [25] . If each customer requests one server and service times do not depend on customer types then trunk reservation policies are optimal [21, 9] and, in addition, the problem is polynomial because an optimal policy can be found via linear programming; see e.g. Theorem 2.1. The survey of applications of MDPs to communication networks by Altman [1] provides additional references on admission control. This paper is organized as follows. We formulate the problem and the main results in Section 2. Following Feinberg and Reiman [9] , we formulate the problem as a unichain semi-Markov decision problem with one constraint and with finite state and action sets. In section 2 we also formulate the linear program (LP) that identifies an optimal policy and explain the meaning of the constantū 1 as an element of the dual solution to this LP.
Previously Feinberg and Reiman [9, Corollary 3.7] proved that if r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m then any optimal stationary policy has a trunk reservation form for an unconstrained problem. Section 3 studies the unconstrained problem when r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ · · · ≥ r m . This case is important because even if we assume that r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m , it is possible that r i = r j for some i, j = 1, . . . , m. Section 4 establishes the link between optimal policies and appropriate LPs. We describe the geometrical structure of the optimal solutions of related LPs in Section 5. Namely, we show that the optimal LP solution, which corresponds to a randomized optimal policy, is a convex combination of two vectors corresponding to (non-randomized) stationary policies, and all these three policies differ at most at one point. In addition, the two non-randomized stationary policies are optimal for the Lagrangian relaxation of the original problem. In Section 6 we prove the main theorem that describes the structure of the optimal policy.
Lagrangian optimization plays an important role for our analysis. We formulate all the required results on Lagrangian optimization in Appendix B. This appendix is important for the following two reasons: (i) for the reference purposes in the main body of the paper, and (ii) we did not find the version of the results needed for our paper in the literature on linear or nonlinear programming.
Problem Formulation and Main Results
We consider a controlled queue that is a generalization of an M/M/c/N queue. The queue has space for at most N customers, where N is a given integer. When there are n customers in the queue, the departure rate is µ n , n = 1, . . . , N. The numbers µ n , n = 1, . . . , N, satisfy the condition µ n−1 ≤ µ n , where µ 0 = 0 and µ 1 > 0. In particular, for an M/M/c/N queue, for some µ > 0, we have
There are m = 1, 2, . . . types of customers arriving according to m independent Poisson processes with the intensities λ i , i = 1, . . . , m, respectively. When a customer arrives, its type becomes known. When there are N customers in the system, the system is full and new arrivals are lost. If the system is not full, upon an arrival of a new customer, a decision of accepting or rejecting this customer is made. A positive reward r i is collected upon completion of serving an accepted type i customer. A nonnegative cost c i incurs due to the rejection or lost of an arriving type i customer. The service time of a customer does not depend on the customer type. Unless otherwise specified, we do not assume that
Our goal is to maximize the average rewards the system collects per unit time, subject to the constraint on the average costs per unit time. In particular, we are interested in the problem when we want to maximize the average rewards per unit time subject to the blocking probability constraint for a certain type of customers. In the more particular case, when r 1 > · · · > r m and the constraint is the blocking probability for type 1 customers, this problem was studied by Feinberg and Reiman [9] .
Following Feinberg and Reiman [9] , we model the problem via a semi-Markov decision process (SMDP). Since the sojourn time between actions are exponentially distributed, this problem is actually an ESMDP (exponential semi-Markov decision process). Please refer to Feinberg [7] for more details. Notice that this problem can also be formulated as a continuous time Markov decision process. In order to achieve the same preliminary result by using continuous time Markov decision processes: when the problem is feasible, there exists a randomized stationary optimal policy that uses a randomization procedure in at most one state, the extra technical difficulty is only to prove that the controlled process has no absorbing states; see Feinberg [5] . However, from the consistency aspect, since the results by Feinberg and Reiman [9] are based on Feinberg [5] instead of Feinberg [6] , we continue the approach from [9] using an SMDP model.
Let us define the state space
. If the state of the system is n = 0, . . . , N − 1, this means that a departing customer leaves n customers in the system. The state (n, i) means that an arrival of type i sees n customers in the system. Thus, the state space I represents the departure and arrival epochs.
The action set A = {0, 1}. For n = 0, . . . , N − 1 and i = 1, . . . , m, we set A(n, i) = A = {0, 1}, where the action 0 means that the type i arrival should be rejected and the action 1 means that it should be accepted. We also set A(N, i) = {0}. In any state n = 0 . . . , N − 1, we set A(n) = {0}. These are departure epoches and the decision maker does not decide to accept or reject customers in these states. Therefore, we model these action sets A(n) as singletons.
Let τ (s, a) denote the average time that the system spends in a state s ∈ I if an action a ∈ A(s) is chosen in this state. Let p(s, s , a) be the transition probability from the state s to s if action a ∈ A(s) is chosen. For notational convenience, we write τ (n) and p(n, s) instead of τ (n, 0) and p(n, s, 0) respectively for n = 0, .
For simplicity, let the reward be collected when an arrival is accepted. Therefore,
In summary, we have defined an SMDP with the state space I; action space A, set A(s) of available actions at states s ∈ I; transition probability p(s, s , a); average sojourn time τ (s, a) in a state s ∈ I after an action a is chosen; reward function r(s, a) and cost function c(s, a).
Let t 0 = 0. If t n is defined for some n = 0, 1, . . . , we define t n+1 as the time epoch of either the next departure or arrival, whichever occurs first. Therefore, 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · is the sequence of jump epochs when the state of the system changes. A strategy π, which may be randomized and past-dependent, assigns actions a n at epoch t n to control the system. We define the long-run average rewards earned by the system as
r(x n , a n ) and the long-run average cost of the system as
where z is an initial state, π is a strategy, x n is the state at epoch t n , E π z is the expectation operator for the initial state z and the strategy π, and N (t) = max{n : t n ≤ t} is the number of jumps by time epoch t.
A strategy is called a randomized stationary policy if assigned actions a n depend only on the current state x n . In addition, if a n is a deterministic function of x n , the corresponding strategy is called a stationary policy.
According to [9, p.471] , the Unichain Condition holds for this model. The Unichain Condition means that any randomized stationary policy defines a Markov chain on the system's state space with one ergodic class and a (possibly empty) set of transient states. Under this condition, the objective functions W (z, φ) and C(z, φ) do not depend on the initial state z ∈ I when φ is a randomized stationary policy. So, we shall write W (φ) and C(φ) instead of W (z, φ) and C(z, φ) respectively when φ is a randomized stationary policy. According to [5, Theorem 8.1(iv) ], if the Unichain Condition holds and the SMDP problem is feasible for some z, then there exists a randomized stationary policy that is optimal for any initial state z and the value does not depend on z. Thus, our problem can be modeled as the following optimization problem with a randomized stationary policy φ as the variable:
Since an action can be chosen only at the arrival epochs, a randomized stationary policy φ for our problem can be defined by φ(n, i), n = 0, . . . , N − 1, i = 1, . . . , m: the probability of accepting an arrival of type i when there are n customers in the system.
A randomized stationary policy φ is called k-randomized stationary, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , if the number of states (n, i) where 0 < φ(n, i) < 1 is less than or equal to k. The notions of stationary and 0-randomized stationary policies coincide.
Consider the following constraints for the variables (x, P ), where
For the same variables x and P , we formulate the Linear Program (LP) 6) and the LP
For a vector (x, P ) satisfying (2.2)-(2.5), consider a randomized stationary policy φ such that: In view of (2.4) and (2.5), the feasible region of the LP (2.6) is bounded. Therefore, this LP has an optimal solution, if it is feasible. If the LP (2.6) is feasible, we consider an arbitrary optimal dual solution (ū,v),ū = (ū 1 , . . . ,ū 2mN +1 ) andv = (v 1 , . . . ,v N +1 ), whereū corresponds to all inequality constraints andv corresponds to equality constraints, and introduce the following LP:
Notice that most of the contemporary LP solvers use interior point methods and calculate the primal and dual solutions simultaneously, Therefore, we do not formulate the dual LP in this paper. Hereū 1 is also called the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the first constraint. More details about the Lagrangian function and multipliers can be found in Appendix B. Lemma B.1 in Appendix B and explanations preceding it imply the following result.
Lemma 2.1. If the LP (2.6) is feasible then: (i) any optimal solution of the LP (2.6) is an optimal solution of the LP (2.11), and (ii) the optimal values of objective functions for these two LPs are equal.
We notice that for any randomized stationary policy φ there is a unique solution P φ of the following birth-and-death equations:
In other words, P φ n is the limiting probability that there are n customers in the system when the randomized stationary policy φ is used.
In addition, we define
Then (x φ , P φ ) satisfies (2.3)-(2.5) and, therefore, it is a feasible solution of the LP (2.7). In view of Theorem 2.1(i), a randomized stationary policy φ is feasible for the problem (2.1) if and only if (x φ , P φ ) is a feasible solution of the LP (2.6). In addition, according to Theorem 2.1(iii), a randomized stationary policy is optimal for the problem (2.1) if and only if (x φ , P φ ) is optimal for the LP (2.6). In particular, according to Corollary 2.1, a randomized stationary policy φ is optimal for the unconstrained problem (2.10) if and only if the vector (x φ , P φ ) is optimal for the LP (2.7). The following theorem links geometrically the optimal solutions of the LP (2.6) to feasible vectors of the LP (2.7). Theorem 2.2. Let φ be a 1-randomized stationary optimal policy for the problem (2.1) . If there exists a state (n 0 , i 0 ) with 0 < φ(n 0 , i 0 ) < 1, consider two stationary policies φ and φ that coincide with φ at all states except the state (n 0 , i 0 ) and
The following theorem is the main result of this paper. 
2).
Consider an average reward SMDP with one constraint. If the Unichain Condition holds and a feasible policy exists, then there exists a 1-randomized stationary optimal policy [5] . Therefore, the previous theorem implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2. If the problem (2.1) is feasible, then there exists an optimal randomized trunk reservation policy that is consistent with r .
Let
According to [9, p. 471 ], for the costs c i defined by (2.16), the average cost C(z, π) has the meaning of the blocking probability for type j customers. Therefore, the problem of maximizing the average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint that the blocking probability for type j customers does not exceed q is equivalent to the problem (2.1) with the cost function c defined in (2.16).
The following corollary describes the structure of optimal policies when the objective is to maximize the average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint on the blocking probability for type j customers. In particular, for the case r 1 > r 2 > . . . > r m , Corollary 2.4 coincides with the main result in Feinberg and Reiman [9] . If the cost constraint limits the blocking probability for several customer types pooled together, say, for customer types belonging to a set J, J ⊂ {1, . . . , m}, then we define Λ J = j∈J λ j and
Then the combined blocking probability for customers in the set J under policy π and initial state z is C(z, π) with the function c i defined by (2.17).
The following corollary describes the structure of optimal policies when the objective is to maximize the average rewards per unit time subject to the constraint on the combined blocking probability for several customer types. 18) and it satisfies the properties:
Unconstrained Problem
For an M/M/c/loss system, Miller [21] proved that if r 1 > r 2 > · · · > r m > 0, then there exists a trunk reservation optimal policy consistent with the rewards r i for the unconstrained problem (2.10). Feinberg and Reiman [9] proved the following stronger result. The following lemma is a particular cases of Lemma 2.5 in [9] that dealt with constrained problems when the constraint was that the blocking probability of type 1 customers is no greater than q. By setting q = 1 in the mentioned statements in [9] , we receive the following result for the unconstrained problem. 
and (2.12) − (2.13). Consider an M/M/1/loss system with two types of customers, λ 1 = λ 2 = µ = 1 and r 1 = 2, r 2 = 1. In this example, an arrival can be accepted only when the system is empty and there are only two trunk reservation policies consistent with the rewards r 1 and r 2 : (i) accept all the arrivals, and (ii) accept only type 1 arrivals. According to Lemma 3.1, at least one of these two policies is optimal. The straightforward analysis of the birth-and-death process defined by (2.12) and (2.13) with two states yields that for the first policy P 0 = 1/3, P 1 = 2/3, and the expected average reward per unit time, computed as in the expression to be maximized in (3.1), equals 1. For the second policy, P 0 = P 1 = 1/2 and the expected average reward per unit time also equals 1. Thus, both trunk reservation policies (i) and (ii) are optimal. Moreover, consider a randomized trunk reservation policy that, when the system is empty, always accepts type 1 arrivals and accepts type 2 arrivals independently with some probability, say p. Under this policy, the straightforward calculations for the birth-and-death process yield that P 0 = The following lemma covers the case r 1 ≥ · · · ≥ r m > 0. However, being motivated by constrained problems, for which it is possible that r i < r i+1 , we do not specify these inequalities in the following lemma. Since the proof of the following lemma is rather technical, we present it in Appendix A. The following corollary from Lemma 3.3 is used in the proof of Theorem 2.3.
Lemma 3.3. Consider any randomized stationary optimal policy φ for the unconstrained problem (2.10). (i) For any i, j, such that r
i > r j , φ(n, i) ≥ φ(n, j), n = 0, . . . , N − 1, i, j = 1, . . . , m.
. , m} then (3.3) holds with
= j. (iv) φ(n, j) ≥ φ(n + 1, j), n = 0, . . . , N − 2, j = 1, . . . , m,(3.
Corollary 3.1. Any stationary optimal policy ϕ for the unconstrained problem (2.10) is a trunk reservation policy consistent with the rewards r i .
The following example demonstrates that, if different types of customers have the same rewards, then for an optimal trunk reservation policy φ, whose existence follows from Corollary 3.1, it is possible that M Proof. The proof is based on contradiction. Without loss of generality, let us assume that r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ · · · ≥ r m > 0. Let (x, P ) be an optimal solution of the LP (2.7) such that there exists 0 < n * ≤ N for which P n * = 0. Then due to (2.4) and (2.5) there exists 0 ≤ n 0 < N for which P n 0 > 0 and P n 0 +1 = 0. In view of (2.3) and (2.5) we have: (i) x(n, i) = 0 for n ≥ n 0 , i = 1, . . . , m, (ii) P n = 0 for n > n 0 , and (iii) P n > 0 for n ≤ n 0 . In the following we construct a feasible point (x , P ) that achieves a larger value of the objective function than the value at (x, P ). We define
We observe that (x , P ) satisfies (2.3)-(2.5). Indeed, (2.4) and (3.5) imply that
. These equalities and (3.6) imply after some simple algebra that the vector (x , P ) satisfies (2.3) and (2.5). To verify (2.4), note that
where the first two equalities follow from (3.5) and the third one follows from n 0 n=1 P n = 1. This verifies (2.4) .
Denote the value of the objective function at (x, P ) and (x , P ) by W and W respectively. In the following, we prove that W > W . Notice that
where the first equality follows from (3.6) and the second equality follows from (3.5). By rearranging (3.7), we have
In addition,
where the first equality follows from the equality x(n, i) = 0, n ≥ n 0 and i = 1, . . . , m; the first inequality follows from the assumption r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ · · · ≥ r m ; the next equality follows from (2.4), and the last inequality follows from the assumption
where the strict inequality follows from P 0 > 0. Since P n 0 +1 > 0, we have that W − W > 0. Note that (x φ , P φ ) strictly increases the value of the objective function compared to (x φ , P φ ), and it satisfies (2.3)-(2.5). Therefore, (x, P ) is not optimal. This contradiction completes the proof.
Justification of the LP formulation
Lemma 3.2 established a link between the unconstrained problem (2.10) and the nonlinear program (3.1). According to the following lemma, the constraint in (2.1) adds an equation to the system (3.1). Based on this, we are ready to give the proof of theorem 2.1. Notice that for any randomized stationary policy φ, there exists a unique vector (P 1 , . . . , P n ) satisfying equations (2.12) and (2.13). Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2.5 in [9] .
Lemma 4.1. A randomized stationary policy φ is optimal (or feasible) for the problem (2.1) if and only if φ(n, i) and the vector
P φ = (P φ 0 , . . . , P φ N ) defined
by (2.12) and (2.13) form an optimal (feasible) solution of the nonlinear program
Proof of Theorem 2.1. (i) Consider a feasible randomized stationary policy φ for the problem (2.1). Lemma 4.1 implies that the vector P φ defined by (2.12) and (2.13) is feasible for the nonlinear program (4.1). Consider x φ defined by (2.14). Then P φ and x φ satisfy (2.2)-(2.5). In addition, (2.14) implies (2.8). Conversely, consider any feasible vector (x, P ) for the LP (2.6). Let φ(n, i) be a randomized stationary policy satisfying (2.8) . Then
Therefore, (φ(n, i), P n ) is feasible for the nonlinear program (4.1). In view of Lemma 4.1, φ is a feasible randomized stationary policy for the problem (2.1).
(ii) Consider the LP (2.11). Lemma 3.4 implies that P n > 0, n = 0, . . . , N , for any optimal solution (x, P ) of this LP. By Lemma 2.1, any optimal solution (x, P ) of the LP (2.6) is optimal for the LP (2.11).
(iii) Consider a randomized stationary optimal policy φ for the problem (2.1). In view of Theorem 2.1(i), (x φ , P φ ) is a feasible solution of the LP (2.6), where (x φ , P φ ) is defined by (2.12)-(2.14). According to Lemma 4.1, (φ, P φ ) is an optimal solution of the nonlinear program (4.1). We shall prove by contradiction that (x φ , P φ ) is an optimal solution of the LP (2.6).
Since the feasible region of the LP (2.6) is bounded, there exists an optimal solution (x , P ) of this LP. Suppose that (x , P ) achieves a larger objective value than (x φ , P φ ) achieves. Due to Theorem 2.1(ii), P n > 0 for all n = 0, . . . , N. Let us define φ (n, i) = x (n, i)/P n . Then (φ , P ) is feasible for the LP (4.1) and it achieves a larger value of the objective function than (φ, P φ ) achieves. This contradicts the fact that (φ, P φ ) is an optimal solution of (4.1).
Conversely, let (x, P ) be an optimal solution of the LP (2.6). We define φ(n, i) = x(n, i)/P n , n = 0, . . . , N, i = 1, . . . , m. According to Lemma 4.1, it suffices to prove that (φ, P ) is an optimal solution of the nonlinear program (4.1) and we shall use contradiction to prove it. Suppose that there exists a feasible solution (φ , P ) of (4.1) and it achieves a larger objective value than (φ, P ) does. Let x (n, i) = φ (n, i)P n . Then (x , P ) is feasible for the LP (2.6), and it achieves a larger value for the objective function than (x, P ) does. This contradicts that (x, P ) is optimal for the LP (2.6).
To prove the second statement in (iii), first we notice that the proved first statement of Theorem 2.1(iii) implies that φ is optimal. Second, we represent the LP (2.6) in a standard LP form, where non-negative variable S is introduced to replace (2.2) with ) and y(n, i) . Because x(n, i)+y(n, i) = P n > 0, x(n, i) and y(n, i) cannot be zero simultaneously. Therefore, for each pair (n, i), either x(n, i) = 0, or y(n, i) = 0 except at most one pair where both of them are non-zero. Since φ(n, i) = x(n, i)/P n , we have that for all pairs (n, i), except at most one, φ(n, i) equals either 0 or 1. Therefore, the policy φ is 1-randomized stationary optimal.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. Statement (i) is Lemma 3.4. Also, (i) and the first part of (ii) follow from Theorems 2.1(ii) and (iii) respectively when G ≥ 1. The proof of the second part of statement (ii) is identical to the proof of the second part of Theorem 2.1(iii) with the only difference that there are 1+N +N ×m constraints and, therefore, there are at most N × m basic variables among x(n, i) and y(n, i). Hence, for each pair (n, i), either x(n, i) = 0 or y(n, i) = 0 but not both. This gives us a non-randomized policy φ.
Geometric properties of optimal solutions
In this section, we prove Theorem 2.2. Consider φ, φ and φ as in Theorem 2.2. According to Theorem 2.1(iii), (x φ , P φ ) is an optimal solution of the LP (2.6). In addition, both (x φ , P φ ) and (x φ , P φ ) are feasible solutions of the LP (2.7).
Lemma 5.1. Let φ, φ and φ be defined as in Theorem 2.2. Consider P φ , P φ , and P φ defined by (2.12) and (2.13) . Then
2)
and P φ n0+1 Proof. We have from (2.12) that
. . , m, and P φ n > 0, n = 0, . . . , N, according to Theorem 2.1(ii). Therefore, we divide (5.5) by (5.6) and obtain P φ n
which is equivalent to (5.1) and (5.2) simultaneously. The proof of (5.3) and (5.4) is similar.
Since φ (n 0 , i 0 ) = 0 and φ (n 0 , i 0 ) = 1, we have 9) where the first equality follows from (2.12) and the second equality follows from (5.8) and from (2.12) applied sequentially. Similarly,
Dividing the first and the last parts of (5.9) by P φ n0+1 , we have
We observe that P φ n0 > 0. Indeed, if P φ n0 = 0, formula (5.9) implies that P φ n 0 +1 = 0. In view of (5.1) and (5.2), P φ n = 0 for all n = 0, . . . , N. Therefore, P φ is not a probability vector. Now we shall prove that t 1 > 1 by contradiction. Suppose t 1 ≤ 1. Then formula (5.1) implies that P φ n ≤ P φ n when n ≤ n 0 . In view of (5.2) and (5.11), we have P φ n < P φ n for n > n 0 . Therefore,
, which contradicts the fact that P φ is a probability vector. Next we prove that t 2 < 1. Since t 1 > 1, we have from (5.1) that
This is a contradiction which proves that t 2 < 1.
To prove t 3 < 1 and t 4 > 1, we divide both sides of the equation (5.10) by P
The rest of the proof is similar to the proofs of t 1 > 1 and t 2 < 1. 
Proof. In view of (5.1) and (5.2), we have
Similarly, (5.3) and (5.4) imply
We introduce u = . Then (5.14) and (2.13) can be rewritten as
This implies that
Similarly, (5.15) and (2.13) imply
Thus,
The second equality of (5.16) is equivalent to the first equality of (5.13).
We rewrite (5.11) and (5.12) respectively as
and
Dividing (5.17) by (5.18), we have
where the second equality follows from (5.16). To conclude the proof, we observe that the equality
is equivalent to the second equality in (5.13).
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Since both φ and φ are non-randomized stationary policies and φ(n, i) = φ (n, i) = φ (n, i) for any (n, i) = (n 0 , i 0 ), according to (2.14) , either
, and x φ (n, i) = P φ n for any (n, i) = (n 0 , i 0 ). Thus, in view of Lemma 5.1, to prove that (x φ , P φ ) is a convex combination of vectors (x φ , P φ ) and (x φ , P φ ), it suffices to show that the following three equalities 20) and αP
hold. Since φ (n 0 , i 0 ) = 0 and φ (n 0 , i 0 ) = 1, we have that
These equalities can be rewritten as 
, and α =
. In view of Lemma 5.2, all these values of α are equal. In addition, 0 < α < 1 because t 1 > 1 > t 3 .
Constrained optimization
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 2.3. Proof of Theorem 2.3. Consider any 1-randomized stationary optimal policy φ for the problem (2.1). Due to Theorem 2.1(iii), the vector (x φ , P φ ) defined by (2.12)-(2.14) is an optimal solution of the LP (2.6). Let us consider the following two cases: (i) there exists a state (n 0 , i 0 ) with 0 < φ(n 0 , i 0 ) < 1; and (ii) φ is non-randomized. In case (i), Theorem 2.2 implies that there exist two stationary policies φ and φ that coincide with φ at all states except the state (n 0 , i 0 ), such that (x φ , P φ ) is a convex combination of feasible solutions (x φ , P φ ) and (x φ , P φ ) of the LP (2.7). In addition, φ (n 0 , i 0 ) = 0 and φ (n 0 , i 0 ) = 1. Since the LP (2.7) and the LP (2.11) have the same feasible regions, (x φ , P φ ) and (x φ , P φ ) are feasible for the LP (2.11). In view of Lemma 2.1, (x φ , P φ ) is optimal for the LP (2.11). Therefore, (x φ , P φ ) and (x φ , P φ ) are both optimal for the LP (2.11). Consider the reward r i = r i +ū 1 c i , i = 1, . . . , m, defined prior to the introduction of the LP (2.11). According to Corollary 2.1, φ and φ are both optimal stationary policies for an unconstrained problem (2.10) with the rewards r i . In view of Corollary 3.1, φ and φ are trunk reservation policies consistent with the rewards r i . Consider any type i such that
. Thus, φ is a randomized trunk reservation policy consistent with the rewards r i . In case (ii), vector (x φ , P φ ) is optimal for the LP (2.11) and by Corollary 3.1, φ is a trunk reservation policy consistent with r . Example 6.1. Consider the M/M/1/loss queue with 3 types of customers described in Example 3.2. In addition, we set the costs c 1 = 3, c 2 = 8, c 3 = 1 and the cost constraint G = 4.5. By Theorem 2.1, any optimal policy for the constrained problem can be found by solving the LP (2.6) that has the following form maximize x,P 2x(0, 1) + 0.4x(0, 2) + 0.6x(0, 3) subject to
We shall show that any randomized trunk reservation policy φ k defined by the thresholds (1, k, 0),
Indeed, according to Example 3.2, the value of the above LP is not greater than 1. In addition, the last constraint and (2.8) imply that x(0, 1) = P 0 , x(0, 2) = kP 0 , and x(0, 3) = 0 for any feasible policy φ k , 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. Therefore, the above LP implies that the best policy among φ k can be found by solving the following mathematical program
The constraint (6.3) and objective function (6.1) imply that the optimal value is indeed 1. Constraints (6.2)-(6.5) imply that any k ∈ [ 40 57 , 1] corresponds to the optimal solution (x, P ) of the original LP with P 0 = (2 + 0.4k) −1 , P 1 = 1 − P 0 , x(0, 1) = P 0 , x(0, 2) = kP 0 , and x(0, 3) = 0. Thus, we have proved that any policy φ k , 40 57 ≤ k ≤ 1, is optimal. Being referred as "shadow prices", Lagrangian multipliers measure the rate of change of the optimum objective function value with respect to changes in the constraints [10, p. 37] . In this example, since any small perturbation of the constraint G in (2.2) does not change the optimum objective function value,ū 1 = 0 and it is unique. Theorem 2.3 implies that r 1 = 2 > r 2 = r 3 = 1. It is easy to verify that any randomized trunk reservation policy ψ, (M [9] ). Then
By letting the right hand side of the constraint (1.8) in [9] equal 1 in Lemma A.1, we obtain the following result for an unconstrained problem. for the smaller size problem with combined classes. According to (2.12) and (2.13), P φ n = P ψ n for all n. Therefore, W (φ) = W (ψ) and ψ is a randomized stationary optimal policy for the problem (2.10). Therefore, ψ is also optimal for the problem with K customer classes with distinct rewards. In view of Corollary A.1, ψ ∈ ∆ 1 ∩ ∆ 2 ∩ ∆ 3 in the problem with K customer types. Since ψ ∈ ∆ 1 in the model with K customer classes, (i) and (ii) hold. Similarly, ψ ∈ ∆ 2 implies (iii) and ψ ∈ ∆ 3 implies (iv).
Appendix B. Lagrangian Relaxation
In this appendix we present the results on Lagrangian optimization in convex and linear programming used in this paper. Let us consider a mathematical programming problem P : = (g 1 , . . . , g s ) T and h = (h 1 , . . . , h p ) T . For a vector-valued function F (x) = (F 1 (x), . . . , F N (x)) T defined for some x ∈ R n , where N = 1, 2, . . ., we denote by ∇F (x) the n × N gradient matrix with the elements ∂F i (x)/∂x i whenever all these partial derivatives exist at the point x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) . The following two statements are well-known [20, p. 201 ]: (i) if ∇F (x) exists at x and ∇F is continuous at x, then F is differentiable at x, and (ii) if F is differentiable at x, it is continuous at x and ∇F (x) exists.
For two vectors a and b of equal dimensions, we denote their scalar product by ab. If the objective is to maximize f (x), we observe that max f (x) = − min{−f (x)}.
The corresponding Lagrangian function is L(x, u, v)
Since in this paper all the functions f, g and h are linear, the negative functions of them are also linear and therefore convex.
